Is the cestui que trust real?

IMPERIAL ACTS APPLICATION ACT Act No. 30, 1969
https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-1969-030#sec.38

DIVISION 13.—Recovery of Property on Determination of a Life or Lives.
18 and 19 Charles I I c. 11—The Cestui que Vie Act, 1666. 6 Anne c. 72 (or c. 1 8 ) — T h e Cestui que Vie Act, 1707.

38. ( 1 ) Every person having any estate or interest in any property determinable upon a life or lives who, after the determination of such life or lives without the express consent of the person next immediately entitled upon or after such determination, holds over or continues in possession of such property estate or interest, or of the rents, profits or income thereof, shall be liable in damages or to an account for such rents and profits, or both, to the person entitled to such property, estate, interest, rents, profits or income after the determination of such life or lives.

From the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution

117 Rights of residents in States.

A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.

Paper presented at the Western Australian Bar Association CPD Conference
15 October 2011
Two fundamental questions for the law of trusts by
The Hon Justice James Edelman
Supreme Court of Western Australia
Chancery_ wa_bar_association_cpd_conference_edelman_j_15_oct_2011 (pdf)

Page 7
c. In The Law of Trusts in New South Wales (1961) p 7, Jacobs also focuses upon the trustee’s duties in relation to the trust rights he or she holds, describing the trust as existing when the ‘holder of a legal or equitable interest in certain property is bound by an equitable obligation to hold his interest in that property not for his own exclusive benefit but for the benefit…of another person or persons…’ Unfortunately, years later, as a Justice of the High Court of Australia, Jacobs J saw ‘no difficulty’ in describing a trust as involving a beneficiary as ‘the beneficial owner of the estate of which the vendor is the legal owner’: Chang v Registrar of Titles.20
d. Finally, by far the best, and clearest, description of the trust was that given by F W Maitland (see reference below), in his lectures at Cambridge21
“Equity did not say that the cestui que trust was the owner of the land, it said that the trustee was the owner of the land, but added that he was bound to hold the land for the benefit of the cestui que trust. There was no conflict here. Had there been a conflict here the Judicature Act would have abolished the whole law of trusts.[22] Common law says that A is the owner, equity says that B is the owner, but equity is to prevail, therefore B is the owner and A has no right or duty of any sort or kind in or about the land. Of course the Judicature Act has not acted in this way; it has left the law of trusts just where it stood, because it found no conflict, no variance even, between the rules of the common law and the rules of equity.”
This approach to understanding a beneficiary’s interest as involving an interest which relates to the rights that the trustee holds, rather than being an interest in the trust assets themselves has also gained significant academic support in recent years.23

Source of the quote above:

EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES BY F. W. MAITLAND, LL.D., D.C.L.
LATE DOWNING PROFESSOR OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Chancery_equityalsoformso00mait.pdf (21Mb file saved if anyone needs it, not providing here, it will blow the bandwidth!)
https://dn790006.ca.archive.org/0/items/equityalsoformso00mait/equityalsoformso00mait.pdf (url of file in archives)
Page 17
Let me take an instance or two in which something that may for one moment look like a conflict becomes no conflict at all when it is examined. Take the case of a trust. An examiner will sometimes be told that whereas the common law said that the trustee was the owner of the land, equity said that the cestui que trust was the owner. Well here in all conscience there seems to be conflict enough. Think what this would mean were it really true. There are two courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction —one says that A is the owner, the other says that B is the owner of Blackacre. That means civil war and utter anarchy. Of course the statement is an extremely crude one, it is a misleading and a dangerous statement —how misleading, how dangerous, we shall see when we come to examine the nature of equitable estates.
Equity did not say that the cestui que trust was the owner of the land, it said that the trustee was the owner of the land, but added that he was bound to hold the land for the benefit of the cestui que trust. There was no conflict here. Had there been a conflict here the clause of the Judicature Act which I have lately read would have abolished the whole law of trusts. Common law says that A is the owner, equity says that B is the owner, but equity is to prevail, therefore B is the owner and A has no right or duty of any sort or kind in or about the land. Of course the Judicature Act has not acted in this way ; it has left the law of trusts just where it stood, because it found no conflict, no variance even, between the rules of the common law and the rules of equity.
Other instances might easily be taken. As a remedy for a breach of contract a court of law could give damages ; as a remedy for a breach of contract a court of equity could grant a decree for specific performance. In many cases it would happen that a man would have his choice between the two remedies—he could go to law for damages, he could ask the Court of Chancery to compel his adversary to do just what he had promised to do.